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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
Case No:  02-3398
__________
SANDRA MARTIN,
               Appellant
        v.
HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT
CORPORATION
             
On Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Western District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. A. No. 00-850)
District Judge:  The Honorable Donald Ziegler
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 14, 2003
__________
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges





I.     FACTS
Sandra Martin is an African American woman who was born on January 10, 1944. 
Martin was employed by Health Care and Retirement Corporation (“HCR”) at their Sky
Vue Terrace facility in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
In March of 1998, Martin was Director of Nursing.  At that time the Pennsylvania
Department of Health cited Sky Vue for failure to “provide each resident with sufficient
fluid intake to maintain proper hydration and health.”  Nonetheless, Martin’s individual
performance was evaluated in April of 1998 as “above standard.”  In the intervening
months, Gregory Tinz became the Home Administrator and Martin’s supervisor.  Tinz
rated Martin “above standard” in August, 1998.  However on September 25, 1998, Tinz
met with Martin to discuss some problems with her job performance.  At that meeting,
Martin accused Tinz of being a racist.  Subsequently, in his September evaluation of
Martin, Tinz rated Martin’s overall performance as “standard” and on October 1, Martin
was temporarily suspended.
The Department of Health issued a second citation against Sky Vue for insufficient
hydration of residents in October of 1998.  After the second citation, Martin was demoted
to the position of Director of Clinical Programs, an assistant Director of Nursing position. 
Donna Erdeljac became the new Director of Nursing.
On October 27, 1998, Mrs. Marchewka, the wife of a patient/resident, allegedly
3twice attempted to speak to Martin but was ignored.  Mrs. Marchewka complained to
Tinz about Martin. 
Then, on November 2, 1998, Corine Wilson nee Twomey, the daughter of another
patient/resident, approached Nurse Darrell Peters and told him that she saw urine under
her mother’s wheelchair cushion and wanted to speak to the Director of Nursing.  Peters
could not locate Erdeljac, so he told Martin about Twomey’s complaint.  Martin did not
speak to Twomey or investigate the problem, but told Peters to speak with Twomey
himself and leave a note for Erdeljac. 
On November 5, 1998, Martin was terminated.   Tinz told Martin the reason she
was being terminated was because she failed to respond to resident family concerns. 
II.     PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Martin filed a complaint alleging that she was terminated in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et. seq., the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 951 et. seq.  HCR moved for summary
judgment, and the District Court granted the motion by an order and opinion dated July
31, 2002.
III. JURISDICTION
The District Court had jurisdiction over Martin’s Title VII and ADEA claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over her PHRA claim
4pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal from summary
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court exercises plenary review over an order of a district court granting
summary judgment.  See Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F. 3d 1445, 1449 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary
judgment must be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine
issue of fact exists “only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could
find for the non-moving party.” Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 694 (3d Cir. 1988)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). 
V.     LEGAL ANALYSIS
A claim of termination in violation of Title VII and the ADEA is analyzed under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the termination and finally plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was a pretext for
discrimination.  See id. at 802.
Here, the parties agree that Martin made out a prima facie case under Title VII and
the ADEA.  HCR then proffered Martin’s actions in the Twomey and Marchewka
5incidents as the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination.  Thus, the
main issue is whether Martin has introduced sufficient evidence to permit a finder of fact
to reasonably infer that these reasons were pretext.
 In order to show pretext, Martin must point to some evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could either disbelieve HCR’s articulated legitimate reason or
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of HCR’s actions.  Abramson v. William Patterson College of New
Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764
(3d Cir. 1994)); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Shorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir.
1992).  To disbelieve the employer’s proffered reason, the question is not whether the
action was prudent, but whether appellant has shown “such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of
credence[.]" Fuentes, 32 F. 3d at 765 (internal quotation omitted).  Alternately, to show
the discriminatory reason was more likely than not the motivating reason, a plaintiff can
introduce evidence of the employer’s past treatment of her, or evidence of the employer’s
general policy and practice with respect to minority employees.  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523-
24.
Martin points to six pieces of evidence which she claims could support a finding of
pretext.  First, she points out that Stephanie Russo, a Human Resources manager and
     1 Martin contends that the District Court erred in concluding that Russo was not a1
decision-maker. The District Court arrived at this conclusion based on Russo’s testimony2
that she did not give any input into whether Martin should be terminated.  However,3
Martin points out that HCR included Russo in the list of “persons who participated in the4
decision to terminate Martin.” Even presuming Russo was a decision-maker, her5
testimony was insufficient to establish pretext for the reasons discussed in the main text.6
     2 Erdeljac did discuss the incidents with Martin, however.1
6
someone Martin claims was a decision-maker1, stated that the Marchewka incident might
have been a misunderstanding.  Even if Russo were a decision-maker, there were other
decision-makers such as Tinz who believed the misconduct was intentional, and a
disagreement among decision-makers does not show pretext. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 767. 
 Additionally, even if Tinz was wrong or mistaken in believing Martin’s misconduct, this
does not make his reason pretextual. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (“To discredit the
employer’s proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot show that the employer’s
decision was wrong or mistaken since the factual dispute at issue is whether
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd,
prudent or competent.”); Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d
Cir. 1997) (question is not whether employer made a sound employment decision, but
whether the real reason for the decision was discrimination). 
Second, Martin says that pretext can be shown by the fact that Tinz never
personally spoke with her or Peters regarding the two incidents, and that he did not give
her an opportunity to defend herself.2  Even if Tinz was remiss in relying upon the
complaints brought to him by Ms. Marchewka and relayed to him by Erdeljac, rather than
7speaking with Martin or Peters directly, the question is whether Tinz actually believed the
descriptions of the incidents to be accurate and relied upon them in Martin’s termination.
See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 766-67.  Tinz stated that he did not speak with Martin because she
had a pattern of failing to respond to complaints and criticism and her credibility “was
very low.”  Martin did not introduce any evidence suggesting that Tinz did not believe the
incidents relayed by Marchewka and Erdeljac.  Martin even admitted that she knew of no
evidence showing that these reports were not Tinz’s motivation for firing her.  Her
evidence only challenged the underlying truth of those reports.  Therefore, Tinz’s failure
to give Martin a chance to tell her side of the story cannot support a finding of pretext.
Third, Martin points to the inconsistencies between what Peters says he reported
versus what Tinz, Russo and Erdeljac claim he said.   Erdeljac, Russo and Tinz all
testified that Peters asked Martin to speak with Twomey and she refused.  However,
Peters testified that he never asked Martin to speak to Twomey, only that he informed her
of the situation.  This discrepancy is not enough to establish pretext.  First, as discussed
supra, the truth of the reports conveyed to Tinz was immaterial as long as he reasonably
believed the reports.  In addition, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Martin
and assuming that Peters did not ask her to speak to Twomey, this still would not justify
Martin’s actions.  Martin was not being disciplined because she ignored a subordinate’s
request that she speak to Twomey.  Rather, the purported concern with Martin’s actions
was that she should have taken it upon herself to speak to Twomey once she heard about
8Twomey’s complaint.  Twomey had previously called the Department of Health to
complain, and part of Martin’s job as a supervisor was to deal with family members. 
Therefore, this discrepancy does nothing to undermine the Twomey incident as a
legitimate basis for Martin’s termination. 
Fourth, Martin points out that she had “above average” performance reviews prior
to her accusation to Tinz that he was a racist, after which she was only rated as “average.” 
  However, HCR did not assert Martin’s September review as a reason for her
termination, but relied on the two incidents that occurred in October and November.  Her
September review is, therefore, not even relevant to our pretext analysis.  Cf. Colgan v.
Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1422 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment
on ADEA where plaintiff’s negative review, which formed the basis for his discharge,
was given shortly after he refused to take early retirement and could be found pretextual).
  Fifth, Martin points to HCR’s alleged failure to progressively discipline her for the
Marchewka and Twomey incidents as evidence of pretext.  Since Martin was previously
demoted, she was progressively disciplined.  In addition, an employer’s decision that an
incident is serious enough to warrant termination rather than a less severe punishment
does not show that the reason for termination is pretextual.  Cf. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765
(an imprudent decision does not show pretext).    
Finally, Martin points to testimony by Peters and Russo that she was a nice, cordial
person, and that the incidents alleged are not consistent with her typical conduct and
9demeanor.  Assuming arguendo this testimony would be admissible, co-workers’
opinions that Martin would not have rebuffed Marchewka and Twomey intentionally
cannot show that Tinz and the other decision-makers were lying when they said that they
thought she mishandled those incidents.  See Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
933 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1991) (co-worker’s opinions that plaintiff did not deserve a
negative rating or to be discharged could not establish that negative rating was pretextual
where rating was not wildly out of line with other indicia of the plaintiff’s performance). 
Moreover, as discussed supra, even if Russo were a decision-maker who thought well of
Martin, “the fact that the relevant decision-makers disagree about the plaintiff’s
qualifications does not evidence discrimination.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 767.
VI.     CONCLUSION
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
______________________________________
 /s/ D. Brooks Smith                                       
Circuit Judge
